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ABSTRACT
When energy prices change during the day, users will sched-
ule their appliances with the aim of minimizing their bill. If
the variable price component depends on the peak demand
during each given hour, users will distribute their consump-
tion more evenly during the day, resulting in lower peak con-
sumption. The process can be automated by means of an
Energy Management System that chooses the best schedule
that satisfies the user’s delay tolerance threshold. In turn,
delay tolerance thresholds may slowly vary over time. In
fact, users may be willing to change their threshold to match
the threshold of their social group, especially if there is evi-
dence that friends with a more flexible approach have paid a
lower bill. We show that social interaction can increase the
flexibility of users and lower the peak power, resulting in a
more smooth usage of energy throughout the day.
Keywords
Smart Grid; Demand Side Management; Agent-Based Mod-
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1. INTRODUCTION
The application of Demand Side Management (DSM) ap-
proaches to the smart grid ecosystem has recently gained
popularity and several frameworks aimed at shaping the ag-
gregated power load curve of groups of customers [21] (e.g.
to reduce/shift consumption peaks [27]), avoiding outages
and improving power quality [11], or maximising the usage
of Renewable Energy Sources (RESes) [13] have been pro-
posed.
In DSM, different strategies may be adopted to moti-
vate users to alter their energy usage patterns. Historically,
stakeholders have focused on price-based policies: dynamic
pricing schemes exhibiting hourly variations and reflecting
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the costs incurred by the smart grid system to satisfy the
customers’ demand have proven to be effective when the
objective is the minimization of the users’ bill [7, 12]. To
this aim, customers may opt for coordinated optimization
schemes to avoid the drawbacks of uncoordinated shifts in
their energy usage schedules (e.g. excessive consumption
peaks during low-price periods). Coordinated solutions in-
clude centralized and distributed DSM frameworks: the for-
mer typically maximize a shared utility function [5], whereas
in the latter each consumer locally defines her energy plan
according to her personal preferences (e.g. bill minimization
or comfort maximization).
However, several recent studies have investigated the ef-
fectiveness of non-monetary strategies in shaping/reducing
consumption by stimulating long-term changes in beliefs and
norms [10, 3, 20]. Indeed, consumers do not live in isolation:
they can interact with each others and with public institu-
tions, and therefore being influenced in their own attitudes,
preferences and possible actions. This approach is consis-
tent with the sociological paradigm of “Homo Socialis” [14],
according to which agents’ actions are not only determined
by the desire to maximize their utility but also driven by
shared norms, roles, and relationships.
The main objective of our work is to take into account
both the role of price policies and the influence mechanisms
of norms on energy consumption behaviors. To this aim,
we propose a distributed game-theoretic DSM framework
which relies on an agent-based modeling approach. The
framework includes a model of the social structures and in-
teraction models which define the reciprocal influences of
socially-connected agents. These models make it possible
to study the impact of social interaction on the user tol-
erance of a starting delay of appliances with and without
knowledge of the electricity bill of other users. In turn, the
impact of delay tolerance on the electricity bill is modeled
by using the a load scheduling game for distributed demand
side management, where rational agents run a distributed
protocol to minimize the users’ bills. The main contribu-
tions of this paper are: (1) a description of the interaction
mechanisms aimed at modeling the influences of society on
individual delay tolerance preferences; (2) an evaluation of
how individual delay tolerance preferences may be changed
by social interactions, which in turn affects the aggregated
energy consumption curve obtained at the end of the execu-
tion of the load scheduling game.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion 2 provides a short overview of the related literature,
whereas Section 3 describes the structure of the agent-based
model. The performance assessment of our proposed model
and the discussion of the experimental results are provided
in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in the final Section.
2. RELATEDWORK
Agent-Based Models (ABMs) have raised interest in the
smart grid research community as a promising approach to
capture the complex interdependencies in the behaviour of
electricity users. Several recent studies propose frameworks
incorporating multi-agent systems to collaboratively detect
and react to grid outages [23], to improve the voltage profile
by means of active/reactive power load control [1], or to
develop energy market control strategies [8].
Numerous ABMs tackle socio-behavioural aspects of the
interactions among users and between users and utilities:
Worm et al. [28] propose a two-layered framework includ-
ing a short-term choice model which captures the effects of
energy price variations on the users’ consumption patterns,
depending on their comfort needs and on the presence of lo-
cal RESes (e.g. solar panels), and a long-term behavioural
model which defines how social interactions may alter users’
attitudes towards comfort requirements, energy efficiency,
usage of RESes, and price policies. Similarly, in this work
we study the effects of social pressure on a user-defined delay
tolerance threshold, taking into account the users’ personal
price-delay trade-off.
Ramchurn et al. [24] describe a decentralised DSM frame-
work which allows autonomous software agents installed at
the customers’ premises to collaboratively schedule the us-
age of domestic controllable appliances with the aim of min-
imising peaks in the aggregated consumption within a neigh-
bourhood, assuming the usage of dynamic pricing. The
framework includes an adaptive mechanism which models
the learning process adopted by the users to modify the de-
ferral time of their controllable loads based on predicted
market prices for the next day. Our proposed solution is
also aimed at peak shaving and adopts a similar learning
approach to update the users’ delay tolerance threshold.
In the distributed DSM systems proposed by Barbato et
al. [6] and Chavali et al. [9], residential user agents are mod-
elled as rational entities who solve a Mixed Integer Linear
Program (MILP) to minimise their energy bill. Under this
assumption (i.e., each user applies a best response strategy),
the users can be considered as players in a non-cooperative
game theoretical framework: it has been proved in [26] that
such game is a generalised ordinal potential game which con-
verge in a few steps to a pure Nash Equilibrium. In this
paper we adopt the same assumptions and build upon the
theoretical results therein discussed. However, in this paper
the MILP formulation therein provided has been modified
to take into account delay tolerance thresholds based on the
users’ attitudes.
Among the ABMs investigating influence and imitation
mechanisms between agents, Helbing et al. [15] propose a
model of norm formation in scenarios where agents exhibit
incompatible preferences, and where rewards or punishment
mechanisms are adopted to encourage conformity to the be-
haviour of others. In [16], Klein et al. introduce a compu-
tational model for habit contagion and change in a social
network, in which cognitive processes are combined with in-
teraction mechanisms.
Two models have been recently proposed to study in-
fluence and diffusions mechanism in residential use water
consumption. Rixon et al. [25] propose an ABM within
a memetic framework capturing imitation of water use be-
haviour. Agents are assumed to be characterised by a degree
of belief in water saving encoded in memes (some which are
explicit water saving memes and some which are not and
suggest indifferent behaviour), and to consume water ac-
cording to them. Memes are thence spread based on social
interaction.
The model proposed by Athanasiadis et al. in [2] aims
at estimating water consumption under different scenarios
of pricing policies, taking into account the propagation of
water conservation signals among individual consumers, and
responsiveness to water conservation policies. In particular,
users are classified depending on their capability to influence
others and to understand influence signals sent by others. In
our paper, we adopt a similar characterisation of the social
attitudes of the users.
3. THE ABM FRAMEWORK
3.1 Architecture
We consider a set of residential users, U , who allocate their
power demand over a 24-hour time period divided into a set,
T , of time slots of duration T . Each user u ∈ U owns a set
of non-interruptible electric appliances, Au, that must run
once a day. The load profile of each appliance a ∈ Au lasts
Nau time slots and its value in the nth time slot is given by
luan (with n ∈ Nau = {1, 2.., Nau}). For the sake of easiness,
we assume that luan is constant for the whole duration of
the nth time slot. Each appliance a ∈ Au is also associated
to a set of parameters ctau ∈ [0, 1] which define the comfort
level perceived by user u in starting appliance a at time slot
t ∈ T . The rationale behind the definition of such comfort
level is the following: each user decides a preferred time slot
for the starting time of her appliances. However, in case of
deferrable appliances, she can tolerate to delay the starting
time up to a certain number of time slots. Intuitively, the
higher the delay is, the less comfortable such schedule is per-
ceived by the user. It follows that the less pronounced the
preference of user u for starting appliance a at time slot t
is, the lower ctau is. In the extreme case of c
t
au = 0, user u
will never turn on appliance a at slot t. In addition, user
u specifies a threshold γau ∈ (0, 1] indicating the minimum
acceptable delay tolerance level for appliance a, which de-
fines the degree of flexibility of the user in scheduling her
appliances: the lower γau is, the more tolerant to delaying
their starting time the user will be.
Each user u ∈ U may own two different types of appli-
ances. Fixed appliances (e.g., lights, TV), represented by
the subset AFu ⊆ Au, are non-shiftable and their starting
time is predefined. Such constraint is imposed by assuming
that there exists exactly one time slot tau ∈ T such that:
ctau =
{
1 if t = tau
0 else
which guarantees that fixed devices have only one allowed
starting time and that the system is forced to start them
at time tau. Conversely, shiftable appliances (e.g., washing
machine, dishwasher), represented by the subset ASu ⊆ Au,
are controllable devices and their starting time is an output
of a scheduling algorithm. For these appliances, ctau may as-
sume non-zero values in multiple slots, providing that there
exists at least one time slot t such that ctau = 1 (i.e., t is u’s
preferred starting time for appliance a).
The scheduling strategy iu of player u is described by a
set of binary decision variables:
xtau =
{
1 if appliance a of user u is started at time t
0 otherwise
.
The set of all strategies of u is denoted by Iu.
We say that the strategy iu is feasible if it satisfies the
following constraints:∑
a∈AFu
ctaux
t
au ≥ |AFu | (1)
∑
t∈T
ctaux
t
au ≥ γau ∀a ∈ ASu (2)∑
t∈T
xtau = 1 ∀a ∈ Au (3)
Constraints (1)-(2) ensure that the starting time of ev-
ery appliance a provides a comfort level higher than the ac-
ceptability threshold γau. Constraints (3) impose that each
appliance is executed exactly once per day.1
The pair ({ctau | t ∈ T , a ∈ Au}, {γtau | a ∈ Au}) is called
the comfort characteristic of user u. Moreover, a comfort
characteristic Cu := ({ctau | t ∈ T , a ∈ Au}, {γtau | a ∈ Au})
of user u is said to be consistent with the contractual limit
piu on the amount of purchasable energy per time slot if
there exists a strategy iu such that:
∑
a∈Au
∑
n∈Nau :
n≤t
luan · xt−n+1au ≤ piu ∀t ∈ T (4)
Constraints (4) determine the overall consumption of the
appliances in each time slot and bound the amount of pur-
chasable energy in order not to exceed the contractual limit,
piu. Such consumption depends on the scheduling strategy:
the energy required by each device a in every time slot t is
equal to the energy consumption indicated by the nth sam-
ple (with n ∈ Nau = {1, 2.., Nau}) of the load profile, luan,
executed at time t. Note that the energy amount indicated
by the nth sample of the appliance load profile is consumed
during slot t only in case the appliance is started at time
t− n+ 1, thus if xt−n+1au = 1.
The non empty set of feasible scheduling strategies con-
sistent with piu is denoted by ICu . We also say that ICu is
determined by (Cu, piu).
We model the price of electricity at time t ∈ T , bt(·) as an
increasing function of the total energy demand of the group
of users U at time t [22]. Under this assumption, prices will
increase during peak consumption periods. Therefore, an
energy utility may impose such a price function with the
goal of inducing peak shaving. For this reason, due to the
conflicting goals of the users, the load scheduling problem
cannot be solved with a centralised approach. Therefore, we
adopt the distributed game-theoretic framework proposed in
[26], which models the problem as a game G = {U , I,P},
defined by: i) the players representing the users in the set
U , each one associated to a comfort characteristic Cu and
1Such a condition can be easily generalised to include an
upper bound on the number of usages of an appliance.
a contractual limit piu on the purchasable energy per time
slot; ii) the strategy set I ,∏u∈U ICuu , where ICuu indicates
the strategy set of player u corresponding to her feasible load
schedules determined by (Cu, piu) (we assume here that such
set is not empty); iii) the payoff function set P , {Pu}u∈U ,
where Pu is the payoff function of user u, which coincides
with her daily electricity bill.
The payoff function of each player, Pu, is defined as a
function of I as follows:
Pu(I) =
∑
t∈T
yutbt(yt) (5)
where
yut =
∑
a∈Au
∑
n∈Nau :n≤t
luan · xt−n+1au
is the energy demand of user u at time t and bt(yt) is the
price of electricity at time t defined as a linear function of
yt =
∑
u∈U yut, which represents the total electricity de-
mand of the players at time t. In [26], it has been proved
that such function is a regular pricing function. It thence
follows that G is a generalised ordinal potential game, with
P (I) being the potential function. Potential games admit
at least one pure Nash Equilibrium which can be obtained
by applying the Finite Improvement Property (FIP). Such
propriety guarantees that any sequence of asynchronous im-
provement steps is finite and converges to a pure Nash equi-
librium. In particular, a succession of best response updates
converges to a pure equilibrium [17]. As proposed in [26],
we assume that the best response method is implemented
in an iterative way as follows. Users in U are listed in a
predefined order. The first user initiates the algorithm by
choosing his/her optimal load schedule assuming flat tariffs.
Then, the user communicates her scheduled energy profile to
the next user in the list, who executes the same operations
but considering the hourly energy prices calculated from the
expected hourly load obtained by summing the schedules of
all the users in the list. At every iteration energy prices are
updated and, as a consequence, other users can decide to
modify their schedules. The procedure stops when none of
the users alters her schedule in an iteration, meaning that
convergence is reached.
In order to find the optimal schedule, each user solves the
following Mixed Integer Non-linear Programming Model:
min
∑
t∈T
yut · bt (6)
subject to constraints (1)-(4), where bt = b
Anc+s(yut+put),
being put the total energy demand of the players of the set
U \ {u} received by user u at the current game iteration,
bAnc the cost of ancillary services (e.g., electricity transport,
distribution and dispatching, frequency regulation, power
balance) and s the slope of the cost function, respectively.
3.2 The Interaction Scenario
We consider a time span of L days. During each day, users
socially interact with the aim of influencing each other’s de-
lay tolerance thresholds γau. As a consequence of such in-
teractions, user u may modify the values of γau to be used in
the next execution of the load scheduling game (i.e., during
the next optimisation time horizon).
The social interaction is mediated by an automated mech-
anism that collects delay tolerance thresholds and the en-
ergy price paid by the user’s friends and adjusts the user’s
thresholds according to some filtering rule. For example a
user might be willing to adjust her thresholds towards the
thresholds of similar users that pay a lower price. However,
users may not interact with their friends on regular daily
basis (e.g. they may decide to communicate their delay tol-
erance thresholds only occasionally). Therefore, we assume
that each user is characterized by a parameter p`u which is
set to 1 if user u is willing to compare (and possibly revise)
her delay tolerance thresholds on day ` ∈ L, to 0 otherwise.
Moreover, let R[u] be the list of u’s social neighbours. Simi-
larly to the approach proposed in [8], in order to capture the
users’ capability to make rational decisions about whom to
imitate (and up to which extent), for each appliance a ∈ ASu
we consider a two-dimensional attitude space2 (see Figure 1)
where each user locates herself and her neighbours based on
their current delay tolerance threshold γ`au and normalised
daily energy bill per appliance B`au defined as:
B`au =
∑
t∈T bt(yut)
∑
n∈Nau : n≤t
luan · xt−n+1au∑
t∈T bt(yut) · yut
Based on her position, user u defines an area of interest
A`u (see shaded area in Figure 1) representing acceptable
bill-comfort pairs. The criteria for the definition of such
area depend on the personal attitude of the user (e.g., a
user with a strong hedonistic attitude would be willing to
imitate users with a higher delay tolerance threshold than
hers, though their bill is -even significantly- higher than hers,
whereas she would never imitate users with a lower delay
tolerance threshold, even if their daily expense is lower than
hers) and may be revised at each game execution `.
The interaction protocol executed by user u at day ` ∈ L
proceeds as follows. User u defines a boolean parameter ηu′
computed as:
ηu′ =
{
1 if (γ`au, B
`
au) ∈ A`u
0 otherwise
.
For each neighbour u′ ∈ R[u], user u updates the delay
tolerance threshold γ`au of each appliance a : a ∈ ASu ∧ a ∈
ASu′ as follows:
γ`+1au =
γ`au +
∑
u′∈R[u] : ηu′∧p`up`u′=1
ha(u, u
′)(γ`au′ − γ`au)
|R[u]| if (♣) holds
γ`au otherwise
(7)
where ha(u, u
′) is the similarity between the comfort profiles
of users u and u′ with respect to appliance a. In this paper
we will define similarity as half the number of time slots
where ctau and c
t
au′ are both non-zero. The condition (♣) is
γ`au +
∑
u′∈R[u] : ηu′=1∧p`up`u′=1
ha(u, u
′)(γ`au′ − γ`au)
|R[u]| > 0.
User u will then use the updated delay tolerance thresh-
olds γ`+1au in the next day for the execution of the load
scheduling game.
2This assumption also enables the users to redefine the sets
AFu ,ASu before each game execution, e.g. in case some ap-
pliances are not regularly used on daily basis.
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Figure 1: Users’ attitude space
4. NUMERICAL ASSESSMENT
In our tests, the 24-hour time horizon is represented by
a set T of 24 time slots of T = 1 hour each. We con-
sider L = 30 consecutive executions of the load schedul-
ing game presented in Section 3 and simulate social interac-
tions at the end of each execution. The parameters of the
electricity tariff, bt, are defined based on the real-time pric-
ing currently used in Italy for large consumers. Specifically,
bAnc = 0.05e/MWh and s = 2.3× 10−4 e/MWh2.
We consider a scenario with U = 50 users. The set R[u] of
each user’s neighbours is computed based on the topology
of a random scale-free network graph generated according
to the Barabasi-Albert model, which is a popular generative
model for based social networks and online communities [4].
Each user u has a contractual limit, pi, of 3 kW and owns
4 shiftable appliances (i.e.,ASu = { washing machine, dish-
washer, boiler, recharge of robotic vacuum cleaner}) and
7 fixed ones (i.e.,AFu = { refrigerator, purifier, lights, mi-
crowave oven, oven, TV, iron}). The operation of shiftable
appliances is assumed to be controllable and fully automa-
tized (i.e. by means of a home energy management system
such as the one described in [18]). The energy consump-
tion patterns of each appliance have been extracted from
a real dataset [19]. On average, the energy consumption
due to deferrable appliances accounts for 55% of the total
daily consumption. For each appliance, the comfort curve
ctau assumes a right-angled triangular shape of 4 slots dura-
tion randomly placed within the 24-hours scheduling hori-
zon, with values [1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25] (i.e., we assume that the
preferred starting time is the slot t such that ctau = 1 and
that users’ satisfaction decreases linearly with delay). The
initial values of the appliance delay tolerance thresholds γ1au
are randomly chosen with uniform distribution in the range
[0, 0.75]. For the sake of easiness, we always assume that
p`u = 1.
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed in-
teraction mechanism we consider two scenarios: the first one
assumes that the area of interest A`u of user u is defined as:
A`u = {(γ`au′ , B`au′) : B`au′ < B`u}
(i.e., users imitate neighbours whose daily bill is lower than
theirs); in the second one we define A`u as:
A`u = {(γ`au′ , B`au′) : γ`au′ < γ`au}
(i.e., users imitate neighbours who impose lower delay tol-
erance thresholds than theirs). The daily results obtained
in the two scenarios are compared to the ones obtained dur-
ing the first day (i.e. for ` = 1), when no social interac-
tions among the users have occurred. For the assessment,
the following metrics are measured: individual bill, i.e. the
(a) Scenario 1
(b) Scenario 2
Figure 2: Percentual reduction of daily bill and peak energy
consumption depending on the definition of the users’ area
of interest A`u. 95% confidence intervals are plotted.
electricity bill of each user u ∈ U , and peak demand, i.e.
the peak of the aggregated energy demand of the group of
users U defined as maxt yt. Average results obtained over
50 instances of each scenario are reported in Figure 2, which
shows that in both scenarios the imitation of virtuous be-
haviours lead to non negligible decreases of the individual
daily bills and of the aggregate peak energy consumption.
Such reductions are more consistent in scenario 2, i.e. when
users imitate neighbours with lower delay tolerance thresh-
olds, (0.5% bill reduction and more than 1% peak reduc-
tion after one month, versus 0.3% bill reduction and almost
1% peak reduction obtained in scenario 1). This is due to
the fact that achieving a low bill does not necessarily imply
a low delay tolerance threshold: users can indeed achieve
low bills if their preferred appliance usage periods are very
different from the ones of the other users (e.g. they span
night hours), which would lead to lower values of the aggre-
gate power consumption and, consequently, to lower energy
prices. It follows that imitating users with low bills does not
always lead to an increase of the flexibility of the individual
schedules.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the delay tolerance thresh-
old γ`au for the usage of the washing machine for the whole
population of users in a representative instance of the two
scenarios. As depicted in Figure 3a, in the first scenario
the imitation of the neighbours with lower bills leads to a
homogenisation of the thresholds. Moreover, the average
value of γ`au tends to decrease, due to the fact that people
experiencing lower bills are more likely to have chosen low
(a) Scenario 1
(b) Scenario 2
Figure 3: Trend of the whashing machine delay tolerance
threshold γ`au over time depending on the definition of the
users’ area of interest A`u.
delay tolerance thresholds. It follows that imitating them
leads to more elasticity in the scheduling patterns. How-
ever, some users never alter their delay tolerance threshold:
this happens when none of their neighbours ever experiences
lower bill than theirs. Conversely, in scenario 2 the benefit
of imitating neighbours with lower delay tolerance threshold
clearly emerges: in this case, γ`au never increases with time
w.r.t. its initial value and remains constant only in case the
delay tolerance threshold of a given user is always lower than
the one of all her neighbours.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the benefits that social interaction
can have on peak power demand by users with deferrable
appliances. One of the problems with demand side manage-
ment is that user flexibility may vary over time depending
on observed savings and social pressure. In this study we
assume that users are willing to vary their delay tolerance
thresholds over time by matching the ones of the users of
their social group that have a lower energy bill. We show
with simulations that this has a beneficial impact on the
overall peak demand, reducing energy management costs.
The models and the findings of this paper can be used by
utilities to study how much user awareness of other users’
behavior can impact on the demand behavior. The simula-
tions results in this paper show that the knowledge of the
electricity bill or delay tolerance of similar users yields a
peak power reduction in the long term. As future extension,
we plan to evaluate the effect of varying the initial character-
istics of the population to capture different propensities to
imitation of positive/negative behaviors depending on user’s
social attitude and delay tolerances, as well as the impact of
different social network models.
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